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Chinese Investment in Taiwan:  
A Challenge or an Opportunity for Taiwan? 
Chun-yi LEE and Ming-xi YIN 
Abstract: Cross-Strait economic activities are no longer unidirectional. 
The Taiwanese government opened the doors to Chinese investment 
in 2009. This paper addresses the following crucial question: What is 
the impact of Chinese investment on Taiwan’s high-technology indus-
trial development? Two further questions immediately follow: Will 
Chinese investment put Taiwanese industrial development at risk? Will 
an influx of Chinese investment lead to a turning point for Taiwanese 
industry? The paper first reviews Chinese investment in Taiwan under 
the framework of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) and then explains why we have chosen to focus here on the 
high-technology industry in Taiwan. It then outlines the main ele-
ments of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) before 
seeking to answer the above research questions. Fieldwork for this 
paper was conducted from December 2014 to March 2016. Interview-
ees include Chinese investors, along with consultants from a Taiwan-
ese institute created to promote industrial development. 
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The Impact of the ECFA on Chinese Investment 
In June 2009 the Taiwanese government lifted the ban on Chinese 
investment in certain industrial sectors. More importantly, the signing 
of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 
2010 was a significant milestone of cross-Strait economic develop-
ment. The statistical data in this article are taken from the Mainland 
Affairs Council (n.d.) unless otherwise stated. 
The total trade volume between Taiwan and China in 2009 was 
USD 79 billion, according to Taiwanese customs calculations, and 
USD 106 billion, according to mainland China’s calculations. In 2014 
cross-Strait trade volume was USD 130 billion by Taiwan’s calcula-
tion, and USD 198 billion by mainland China’s calculation (Mainland 
Affairs Council n.d.: Table 1). The data indicate that cross-Strait eco-
nomic activities have been growing at an increasing rate over the 
years. However, this growing trade volume is very unbalanced. From 
1991 to July 2015, approved outward investment from Taiwan in 
China amounted to USD 150 billion, which equates to 61.2 per cent 
of Taiwan’s total approved outward investment. By contrast, since 
the Taiwanese government lifted the ban on Chinese investment in 
Taiwan, the actual number of investments from 2009 to February 
2016 was 814, and the total invested amount was USD 1.5 billion 
(Investment Commission 2016). Though this is an impressive amount 
in five years, when compared to Taiwanese investment in China it is 
not very significant. 
The asymmetry of trade dependency between Taiwan and China 
is phenomenal, emphasised by the fact that Taiwan’s trade dependen-
cy on China increased from 4.2 per cent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 
2014 (Kao and Shih 2015). Mainland China is Taiwan’s greatest trad-
ing partner and most important export market. But for mainland 
China, Taiwan holds much less importance: Taiwan’s share of China’s 
trade hovered between 6.1 and 6.8 per cent annually from 1990 to 
2001, peaking in 2002 at 7.2 per cent, but in 2014 declined to 4.5 per 
cent (Kao and Shih 2015: 49–51). 
The ECFA is a cross-Strait interim free trade agreement (FTA) 
(Chou 2010: 3). The discussions leading up to the ECFA started in 
late February 2009, one year after Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu) came to 
power. There were three attempts to draft free trade schemes which 
were similar to ECFA: first, the creation of the cross-Strait Common 
Market Foundation by the Taiwanese vice president at the time, Vin-
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cent Siew (Xiao Wanchang); second, the entry of both China and 
Taiwan into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at the end of 
2001; and, third, the signing of the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer 
Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) in June 2003. However, 
Chou (2010) has argued that the signing of the ECFA and of the 
CEPA are fundamentally different: the CEPA was implemented under 
the “one country, two systems” logic and was an agreement signed 
between the central government (China) and a special administrative 
zone (Hong Kong); this is a very different scenario from the ECFA, 
which was discussed and signed by two political entities (China and 
Taiwan), neither of which has de facto governance capacity over the 
other, though each of them claims to, in different ways. 
Before the ECFA was signed, Chou listed three main reasons for 
Taiwan to support the ECFA, and three main reasons it should op-
pose it (Chou 2010). In the following, we will only discuss those rea-
sons that relate to cross-Strait economic activities. Among the posi-
tive arguments Chou makes, the first and foremost reason for Taiwan 
to sign the ECFA would be to increase the volume of trade with the 
mainland, as China, as has been shown previously, is Taiwan’s main 
trading partner (Chou 2010: 7). Nevertheless, this fact became the 
most important argument used by those opposed to signing the 
ECFA. Campaigners against the ECFA emphasised that it would 
result in China’s gaining access to Taiwanese markets and threaten 
the employment of Taiwanese labourers and farmers. Furthermore, it 
would lead to Taiwan becoming overly dependent on trade with Chi-
na (Chou 2010: 11). 
This paper1 does not intend to argue for or against the ECFA. 
However, these two anti-ECFA arguments present scenarios that are 
actually quite at odds with reality. The concern that signing the ECFA 
would open the door to the Chinese people and threaten domestic 
jobs in Taiwan was a pure construction. The fact is that Taiwanese 
regulations on Chinese people who want to visit Taiwan, let alone to 
reside in Taiwan, are very strict (National Immigration Agency n.d.). 
Although at present, the Taiwanese government allows citizens from 
47 mainland cities to visit Taiwan freely (which means those citizens 

1 The fieldwork for this research benefitted from the generous support of the 
Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. The au-
thors also wish to express their appreciation for two anonymous reviewers’ 
constructive suggestions.  
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can apply for a tourist visa to Taiwan individually, not being restricted 
to travelling within a tourist group), for mainlanders who are not 
from one of those 47 cities, the Taiwanese government specifies that 
Chinese visitors have to join qualified tourist groups in Taiwan, in 
order that it can control the tourist groups’ itineraries. However, this 
opening of cross-Strait tourism does not extend to Chinese investors. 
For instance, my interviewee told me,  
I only can get a 15-day visiting visa each time. This is extremely 
difficult for me as an investor to Taiwan. Fifteen days is a very 
short period for me to arrange details of my business in Taiwan. 
From last April [2013] to now [April 2014], I have been to Taiwan 
at least seven times. If my company only has me as a CEO to set 
up the company, it will be very troublesome, because I can only 
stay in Taiwan for 15 days each time. That’s a very limited period 
of time to actually set up a business in any given country. (An-
onymous 1 2014) 
The argument that Taiwan signing the ECFA would lead to it becom-
ing overly dependent on trade with China is also weak, mainly be-
cause even without signing the ECFA, Taiwan’s trade had already 
become overly dependent on China, as indicated above. It is certainly 
unbalanced and risky for a country to depend on one specific export-
ing market, as with China in Taiwan’s case. However, the argument 
here is that Taiwan’s economy has been overly dependent on the 
Chinese market since the 1990s, so China and Taiwan signing an 
interim FTA like the ECFA would not alter that. 
The signing of the ECFA was finalised in September 2010 (BBC 
News 2010). However, the ECFA is a framework of economic agree-
ments – to give substance to these pacts, more detailed agreements 
have to follow. If signing the ECFA was also an attempt by Taiwan 
to rescue its declining economy, especially after the 2008 financial 
crisis, then the predicted economic benefits for Taiwan were GDP 
growth of 1.65 to 1.72 per cent, employment growth of 2.6 per cent, 
and growth in industrial output of approximately 2.83 per cent (Arm-
strong 2013: 100). Those numbers cannot be verified, since the first 
concrete agreement under the ECFA, the Cross-Strait Service Trade 
Agreement (CSSTA), ran into considerable problems and as of the 
time of writing has not yet been implemented. 
In June 2013, the Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang) began to 
push through the CSSTA without acknowledging the views of the 
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opposition party (Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) and, more 
importantly, the people’s distrust of the ECFA. The CSSTA was 
negotiated and signed in Shanghai on 21 July 2013 by representatives 
of the Straits Exchange Foundation and its Chinese counterpart, the 
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARTS) (Rowen 
2015: 6). Under the CSSTA agreement, 80 sectors of China’s econ-
omy will be opened to Taiwanese investment and 64 sectors of Tai-
wan’s economy to Chinese investment, including hotels, tourism, 
media publishing, and medical services (Rowen 2015). From the 
number of sectors being opened, it looks like China has shown great-
er flexibility in opening itself to Taiwanese investment than vice ver-
sa; however, what most Taiwanese are concerned about with regard 
to the CSSTA is not which party is more willing to open up for the 
other side, but the process of passing this agreement through Tai-
wan’s Legislative Yuan. Anti-CSSTA activists argue that this agree-
ment was concluded during secretive negotiations with China, and 
they claim that the KMT was trying to pass this legislation without 
considering the other party’s objections (Rowen 2015). A massive 
social protest broke out on 18 March 2014: that evening, a huge 
group of occupiers led by the loosely organised student group known 
as the Black Island Nation Youth occupied the Assembly Hall of 
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan; the occupation, which has been known as 
the Sunflower Movement, lasted 24 days, and the signing of the 
CSSTA was indeed suspended. 
Has the Sunflower Movement impacted Chinese willingness to 
invest in Taiwan? At the moment of the writing, the answer from the 
Chinese investors is “yes.” Following the Sunflower Movement’s 
actions, political uncertainty actually became Chinese investors’ big-
gest worry and concern (Anonymous 1 2014; Anonymous 2 2015; 
Anonymous 3 2015): Taiwan’s democracy seems not to guarantee 
Chinese investors a stable enough investment environment. 
The Importance of High-Technology Industry 
This section explains the importance of the IT industry in Taiwan 
and China, then the setting up of IT businesses by Taiwanese inves-
tors in China. 
The reason that the IT sector has far more strategic importance 
than other sectors is because modern IT affects all sectors of the 
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economy by providing both forward and backward linkage (Nau 
1986). As Vincent Wang argues (Wang 1995: 551), the development 
of the IT industry of a country is not a purely economic decision: it 
has more to do with political implications. Furthermore, Chu’s re-
search shows that the IT industry, or specifically the semiconductor 
industry, has the potential to create not only political problems but 
also security concerns, and these relate to both the cross-Strait rela-
tionship and the China–Taiwan–United States triangular relationship 
(Chu 2008). The reason for this is that the most common application 
of the semiconductor industry, making silicon chips, is used in almost 
all civil and military high-tech equipment – for purposes tied to, for 
instance, consumer data processing, communications, the automotive 
industry, and various other industrial, medical, military, and aerospace 
functions. 
The significance of the IT industry can be understood not only 
from a politics/security perspective but also from an economic one. 
The electronic hardware industry is the world’s most important 
goods-producing sector. Not only does it employ more workers and 
generate greater revenue than any other manufacturing sector, its 
products also facilitate productivity in other sectors and stimulate 
innovation across entire economies (Sturgeon and Kawakami 2011: 
121). Since the 1990s, Taiwan has aimed to transform itself from a 
reliable OEM (original equipment manufacturer) into an ODM (ori-
ginal design manufacturer). This means that Taiwanese high-tech 
companies not only want to do low-end assembling and packing but 
also aim to establish their own brands. However, establishing brand-
name companies in the high-tech sector requires a huge amount of 
support from the government, and also a supply of human capital. In 
terms of governmental support, as indicated by Wang (1995) and 
Wong (2012), the Taiwanese government played a significant role in 
promoting the development of high-technology industries in Taiwan. 
In 2014 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) published a report on 
the development of information and communication technology 
(ICT), which rated Taiwan the most advanced among developing 
countries in Asia. Taiwan was even ahead of OECD countries, ac-
cording to the ADB’s report (Asian Development Bank 2014: 76). 
Therefore, from the past to the present, the high-technology industry 
has played an important role in Taiwan’s economic development. 
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Apart from the Taiwanese government’s efforts to create an en-
vironment for innovation, the early business model of most Taiwan-
ese IT/electronics industries was to preserve the upstream factories 
in Taiwan and set up low-end factories in China for cheap labour and 
favourable tax policies. As Lüthje pointed out, Taiwanese manufac-
turers in the microchip industry have taken the lead in building wafer-
fabrication plants in China (Lüthje 2003: 345). The advantage of Tai-
wanese firms is their strong link to Silicon Valley in the United States; 
therefore, Taiwanese firms play a key role in managing relationships 
between Chinese factories and American IT firms. However, Chinese 
domestic firms such as Lenovo and Huawei have also emerged since 
2000, as Hart-Landsberg and Burkett (2006) pointed out. They are 
multinational firms themselves, though it is doubtful whether these 
Chinese domestic firms can be internationally competitive or advance 
in the realm of R&D (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2006: 20). 
China is a net importer of high-tech goods. Between 1997 and 
1999, high-tech goods represented 14 per cent of its imports and 8 
per cent of its exports. These percentages are relatively high, as in the 
same period, the European Union showed a high-tech content of 9.5 
per cent in both exports and imports (Fontagne, Freundberg, and 
Ünal-Kesenci 1999). This indicates that China’s processing trade is 
concentrated mostly in relatively high-tech products and carried out 
largely by foreign firms. 
With regard to Taiwanese investment in China, during the period 
roughly from 2000 to 2010, Taiwanese IT/electronics companies in 
China laid the foundation for China’s IT industry, especially in the 
Yangze River Delta (Kunshan and Suzhou area). As indicated by 
Wang and Lee (2007: 1877), the early model of Taiwanese IT com-
panies’ investment in Suzhou was based on Taiwanese factories’ ur-
gent need for cheaper production sites (referring to both labour costs 
and land rents). Kunshan and Suzhou both became quite ideal candi-
dates because of local officials’ highly corporate attitudes, which en-
couraged Taiwanese business people to settle down there (Lee 2012: 
6). Nevertheless, there are two important points to address here: First 
of all, although the IT industry has been Taiwan’s most important 
sector, as argued earlier in this section, the main motivation for Tai-
wanese IT firms to relocate to China was cheaper production costs. 
As a result, despite the risk of sharing their “know-how” with Chi-
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nese firms or employees, Taiwanese IT investors were migrating 
across the Strait as early as the mid-1990s. 
One of the interviewees pointed out that  
Taiwan is very protective of its patent or industrial knowledge. 
However, Taiwan’s know-how is not high-end, is not innovative; 
Taiwan still learns from Western countries’ know-how and applies 
that knowledge to local markets. In other words, the “know-how” 
in Taiwan can be very easily copied or learned by Chinese inves-
tors. (Anonymous 4 2014)  
The quote from this interviewee rightly reflects the fact that Taiwan 
serves only as a “transmission belt” between Western countries’ ad-
vanced designs and China’s low-skilled production. 
Second, China’s contribution was no longer limited to low-skill-
ed production: since after 2000, the Chinese domestic firms Lenovo 
and Huawei have also emerged, as mentioned above. China also 
ceased to be only a recipient of FDI: since 2005, China has been in-
vesting abroad in more impressive amounts. At the end of 2005, the 
total OFDI flows reached more than USD 12 billion, with an average 
year-on-year increase since 2000 of 123 per cent (MOFCOM 2014). 
Among the industrial categories of investment, technology invest-
ment amounted to 2.31 per cent (MOFCOM 2014). It is therefore 
important for us to give a brief overview of China’s outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) in our next section. 
A Brief Overview of OFDI Theory as Applied to 
China
This section begins with a broad overview of China’s OFDI, then 
proceeds to look more specifically at OFDI flows in different sectors 
and different regions. 
The standard explanation of OFDI is that multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) possess and leverage superior managerial and techno-
logical resources that enable them to enter the global market. In re-
cent years, a number of studies looking at the emergence of Chinese 
MNEs have been challenged on the topic of traditional FDI theories 
by the need to explain Chinese OFDI. One of the strongest criticisms 
of mainstream FDI theories is that they have been built largely on the 
observations of developed country investors (Buckley et al. 2007) and 
fail to capture the unique characteristics of MNEs from emerging 
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economies. For instance, Li (2003) asserts that the ownership–loca-
tion–internalisation (OLI) paradigm cannot explain Chinese MNEs 
very well since they are considered to be latecomers that lack firm-
specific advantages to exploit internationally. More specifically, al-
though Chinese MNEs are also searching for lucrative locations and 
internalising transactions (conforming to the “L” and “I” parts of the 
OLI paradigm), they start from a resource-meagre position without 
sufficient technology and management advantages (the “O” seems to 
be less applicable). Some scholars have found a way to reconcile tra-
ditional FDI theory with the emerging MNEs by arguing that Chi-
nese MNEs present a prevalent case of asset-seeking FDI since most 
of them lack ownership advantages. Broadening the scope of the OLI 
paradigm, Buckley et al. (2007) suggest that Chinese MNEs could 
operate more efficiently in certain industries because of certain ad-
vantages. On the other hand, the mainstream perspective on interna-
tionalisation assumes that firms must exploit their existing ownership 
advantages when they enter the international market. However, Child 
and Rodrigues (2005) point out that Chinese firms prefer to address 
competitive disadvantages over exploiting existing competitive ad-
vantages. This is because Chinese firms need to catch up with early-
developing countries in terms of technology and know-how. Thus, 
the latecomer firms need to build sustainable global competitiveness 
by acquiring appropriate assets and resources. In addition, the conse-
quence of capital-market imperfections in China is that capital is 
available at below-market rates for a considerable period of time, 
creating a semi-permanent disequilibrium in the capital market that 
outward investors can exploit (Buckley et al. 2007). More specifically, 
state-owned firms may have access to capital at below-market rates. 
The inefficient banking systems may make soft loans to potential 
outward investors. This point will be explained further in our next 
section. 
The Determinants of Chinese OFDI 
Although existing theories offer a useful starting point for under-
standing the determinants of Chinese OFDI, it is well accepted that a 
special theory is needed given all the unique features of Chinese firms 
(Buckley et al. 2007). Despite the consensus that foreign-market seek-
ing, cost-reduction seeking, and resource seeking could be the prima-
  46 Chun-yi Lee and Ming-xi Yin 

ry motivations for FDI, the continuing discussion about the unique 
characteristics of developing-country investors is entering a new 
phase in the context of globalisation (Dunning 1995, 2000; Buckley et 
al. 2007; Li 2007; Deng 2009). Specifically, the existing OFDI theory, 
including the OLI model, has been challenged by a growing amount 
of research concerning whether the logic of these frameworks can be 
directly applied to emerging economies and, specifically, to China. 
Differences can be observed in terms of country-, industry-, and 
company-level determinants of Chinese OFDI. Country-level deter-
minants include the size and level of technological and management 
know-how of the host market. Industry-level determinants consider 
the features of different industries. Finally, company-level determi-
nants refer to characteristics of particular firms. 
Country-Level Determinants 
Market-Seeking Motives 
Market-seeking motives are one of the most important drivers for 
Chinese firms. This is what happens when investors try to invest 
abroad in order to benefit from global markets. According to Dun-
ning (2001), increasing domestic competition and overcapacity force 
firms to enter overseas markets. Numerous studies indicate that 
OFDI flow and market size are positively correlated (Deng 2004; Liu, 
Buck, and Shu 2005; Buckley et al. 2007). Despite its large popula-
tion, the Chinese domestic market is limited due to its low GDP. 
Chinese firms are likely to enter the global market, as the domestic 
markets have reached the limits of effective demand (Deng 2004). As 
the Chinese domestic market has become saturated due to inward 
FDI and intensive competition, Chinese firms have tended to relieve 
overcapacity by expanding into foreign markets. However, instead of 
choosing geographically close countries as destinations, Chinese firms 
prefer to invest in developed countries. Luo and Tung (2007) argue 
that the market size and potential of the developed markets could be 
attractive to Chinese firms. Moreover, the fierce competition in big-
ger markets may help firms learn from their competitors, which could 
equip them with crucial competitive advantages in developing mar-
kets. 
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Natural-Resource Seeking 
Natural-resource seeking as a motive is also one of the vital determin-
ants of Chinese OFDI. According to Buckley et al. (2007), China is 
well endowed with natural resources; however, the Chinese govern-
ment still needs to ensure the supply of domestically scarce factors 
given that the reserves of some specific sectors of natural resources 
are actually low in per capita terms. Thus, the authorities in China 
have imposed incentives for firms to engage in natural resource–seek-
ing FDI. At the same time, in order to support its phenomenal growth 
over more than a decade, large, cheap, and easy access to natural 
resources is needed both in the short and long term. 
Industry-Level Determinants of FDI 
In particular industries, Chinese state aid has been provided to firms 
to bolster those firms’ investments abroad. Specifically, firms from 
the automobile and electronic industries are always offered preferen-
tial conditions. Policymaking is implemented at the industry level, 
which determines sector-specific incentives and restrictions on OFDI. 
Previous research has argued that outward FDI is more likely when 
the industry in which particular companies operate is considered 
more important by the Chinese government (Child and Rodrigues 
2005; Buckley et al. 2007; Holtbrügge and Kreppel 2012). Deng 
(2004) also argues that authorities play a crucial role in shaping the 
structure of Chinese outward FDI. In fact, outward FDI from Chi-
nese firms largely reflects governmental priorities and could be con-
sidered as part of the government’s development plan. On the other 
hand, the competitive pressure on a specific industry in the domestic 
market could also influence the investment behaviour of Chinese 
enterprises significantly. Since China’s admission to the WTO, firms 
have been facing increasing competitive pressure from abroad, as 
more and more sectors are open to foreign investors. The competi-
tive pressure of domestic markets in certain industries may drive 
firms to invest abroad. Chinese companies are being strongly encour-
aged to invest abroad. According to KPMG (2015), driven by more 
support than ever before, through such initiatives as the “Silk Road 
Economic Belt” and the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” infra-
structure investment by Chinese firms is expected to grow rapidly. 
The implementation of the “One Belt, One Road” strategy will bring 
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in new development opportunities for outward investment in energy 
cooperation and advanced manufacturing sectors. 
Company-Level Determinants of FDI 
Technology Seeking 
According to Barney (1991), the best way to regard a company is as a 
collection of productive resources, including different assets, capabili-
ties, organisational processes, and information, that enable firms to 
gain a competitive advantage in their domestic markets. After becom-
ing leaders in their domestic markets, firms are willing to enter the 
overseas markets to maintain sustainable growth. However, unlike 
their competitors from developed countries, which often develop 
strong advantages before they internationalise, Chinese firms start 
from a resource-meagre position due to the relatively low level of 
economic and technological development of their home country 
(Wang et al. 2012). Deng (2004) claims that firms from emerging 
countries are more likely to invest in developed countries in order to 
gain the advanced technology to compensate for their ownership 
disadvantages. 
Strategic-Asset Seeking 
Strategic asset–seeking FDI is directed towards the acquisition of 
advanced technology and manufacturing know-how (Buckley et al. 
2007). Dunning (2001) points out that MNEs might be trying to ob-
tain assets such as brand names, know-how, local capabilities, and 
proprietary technologies. Modern management and technology skills 
are also very crucial for firms to build a global brand. OFDI will en-
able Chinese firms, which are in particularly strong demand for tech-
nological and management know-how, to take advantage of global 
opportunities (Hurst 2011). Dunning (2001) observes that Chinese 
firms are considered as strategic-resource constraints in terms of 
brand development and proprietary technology. Deng (2009) also 
points out that strategic resources are the primary motivation behind 
Chinese investment. However, some other company-specific re-
sources, including human resources and advertising resources, could 
also be important determinants of OFDI. 
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Has Chinese Investment Challenged Taiwan’s 
High-Technology Industry? 
As indicated in the first section, the amount of Chinese investment in 
Taiwan, as a whole, is not very significant. It may be futile to discuss 
the challenge of Chinese investment in Taiwan because the number 
of investment cases and the amount of investment are both very low. 
However, the low amount of Chinese investment in Taiwan does not 
necessarily mean there is little challenge from China to Taiwan’s high-
technology industry. As discussed in the second section, the link be-
tween Taiwan and China in the IT industry has been very close since 
the early 1990s, when Taiwanese IT producers started to invest in 
China for cheap land and labour. Therefore, it is difficult to unhook 
the link between Taiwan and China in high-technology production, 
even if at this stage the actual amount of Chinese investment in Tai-
wan is low. This section discusses, first, why Chinese investment in 
Taiwan, judging from the statistics, is low. The argument in this part 
mainly applies to the section on the determinants of China’s OFDI: 
the benchmarks by which to evaluate Chinese IT investors’ willing-
ness to come to Taiwan. Second, apart from direct investment, the 
following section discusses whether there are alternatives to Chinese 
and Taiwanese capital cooperation, with particular consideration to-
wards the second hypothesis raised at the beginning of this paper – 
that is, whether the combination of Chinese capital and Taiwanese 
know-how can push Taiwan onto a higher level of the global value 
chain. 
Why Chinese Investment in Taiwan Is Low 
From a market-seeking perspective, the market in Taiwan is compara-
tively smaller than the mainland domestic market; the size of the 
market, therefore, is determinative. However, although the size of the 
Taiwanese market is smaller, as Taiwan’s internationalisation started 
earlier than the mainland’s, would it be possible for the mainland 
investors to invest in Taiwan as a test run for American or European 
markets? Most of our interviewees from mainland enterprises re-
sponded that, if they want to access American or European markets, 
they would go there directly: they do not need to use Taiwan as a 
“pre-test” for their Western investment (Anonymous 2 2015; An-
onymous 3 2013). From an efficiency-seeking perspective (cost re-
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duction), most of Taiwan’s manufacturing factories have moved to 
China, as indicated above, in order to save on labour costs, and they 
have already completed industrial clusters in most Chinese coastal 
cities. As a result, for Chinese investors, it would be more efficient to 
produce in China than in Taiwan, due to the accessibility of those 
ready-made industrial clusters. What might be a consideration for 
Chinese investors is the resource-seeking perspective. However, here 
we are not referring to natural resources, but rather to the warmth of 
the Taiwanese people. To quote one of my interviewees, a Chinese IT 
service investor:  
Taiwan’s service industry is much more advanced than in China. I 
think China already has the “hardware,” but Taiwan’s service atti-
tude is the key that I think makes it worth it for me to invest in 
Taiwan. (Anonymous 1 2014)  
However, the perception of the warmth of Taiwanese society by Chi-
nese investors has been severely affected by the Sunflower Move-
ment, as described in the first section. 
The high-technology sector is important for the Chinese gov-
ernment to support, as discussed in the second section. The attrac-
tion of Taiwan for Chinese high-technology investors is Taiwanese 
know-how and human capital. Therefore, whether the Chinese com-
panies would have a lot to learn is the key point. As the CEO of a 
Chinese IT company explained,  
Although we have few cultural and language differences with Tai-
wanese firms, we didn’t consider investing in Taiwan because 
Taiwan’s domestic market is not big enough, and Taiwan’s core 
technology is not that mature. (Anonymous 5 2015) 
Another Chinese interviewee expressed it more directly:  
To cooperate with Taiwanese factories has not been our main fo-
cus in the past 10 years. Taiwanese factories’ innovation capacity 
has slowed down; therefore, we are intending to work more with 
German, Japanese, or American companies. (Anonymous 6 2015) 
Even when Taiwan’s innovation capacity creates only a small gap 
between Chinese and Taiwanese factories, the strategy of many Chi-
nese firms is to headhunt Taiwanese engineers or entire R&D de-
partments. Headhunting, in fact, is a much easier way for the Chinese 
high-technology companies to “learn” Taiwanese factories’ core know-
how, as headhunting allows Chinese companies both to sidestep the 
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complications of the Taiwanese government’s regulation of Chinese 
investment and to avoid drawing a hostile reaction from post-Sun-
flower Taiwanese society. Compared to wholescale investment, 
headhunting is also a much more cost-efficient approach for the 
companies. A war of high-technology human capital has started in 
the past five years. The Chinese investors say,  
You can’t blame those Taiwanese skilled engineers for coming to 
the Chinese market. We offer a much wider career development 
vision and to be very realistic, the salary is much better than in 
Taiwan. (Anonymous 7 2015).  
Another interviewee, from the Industrial Technology Research Insti-
tute (ITRI) in Xinzhu, Taiwan, stated,  
We are quite powerless to prevent colleagues leaving for jobs in 
China; when they [the Chinese companies] offer the same salary 
figure but in CNY, it is a real challenge to keep skilled human-
resource capital in Taiwan. (Anonymous 8 2015)  
Skilled human capital is at the heart of high-technology industries, 
and government support is essential to prop up these industries. Tai-
wan had a group of excellent skilled workers in the late 1980s, and 
the government’s decision to develop high-technology industry re-
sulted in the establishment of the Xinzhu Science Park; 30 years later, 
it is unfortunate that we have seen little progress in the face of the 
decline of the skills base, as people have been attracted across the 
Strait by both higher salaries and better career-development pro-
spects. China’s strategic headhunting therefore creates enormous 
challenges for Taiwan’s high-technology industry. As one interviewee 
mentioned, “I graduated from National Chengchi University; now if 
we want to call for an alumni reunion, we will hold it in China not in 
Taiwan” (Anonymous 9 2016).  
Despite this, it should not be suggested that no Chinese inves-
tors intend to come to Taiwan. Towards the end of 2015, Tsinghua 
Unigroup – a mainland Chinese microchip maker – unveiled its plans 
to purchase stakes of 25 per cent in each of two Taiwanese chip-test-
ing companies, Siliconware Precision Industries (SPIL) and ChipMOS 
Technologies, Inc. As part of the SPIL deal, Unigroup pledged ad-
herence to Taiwanese regulations on investment from the mainland 
by producing an industry cooperation plan and declaring its intention 
not to take control over SPIL. There would also be tangible benefits 
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to SPIL in terms of better access to the mainland’s increasingly im-
portant semiconductor market (Culpan and Browning 2015). Yet, 
despite such assurances by the mainland side and potential benefits 
for its Taiwanese counterpart, the deal has been viewed by the Tai-
wanese government as a national security issue, not least because the 
semiconductor industry is a sensitive sector in Taiwan with a key role 
in ensuring its industrial competitiveness (Chao 2015). At the time of 
writing, these two deals were still awaiting approval from the Taiwan-
ese government. On the prospect of a rejection of these investments, 
the CEO of Unigroup, Zhao Weiguo, mentioned in an interview the 
possibility of headhunting human capital from Taiwan as a viable 
alternative if the government prevents the investment (Huang, Chen 
and He 2015). 
Can Chinese Capital Push Taiwan to a Higher Level of 
the Global Value Chain? 
The reasons for the low levels of Chinese investment are to be found 
not only in market elements – for instance, the size of the Taiwanese 
market and capacity of Taiwanese human capital – but also in politics. 
Though the Taiwanese government lifted the ban on Chinese invest-
ment in 2009, it is, as discussed in the first section, difficult for Chi-
nese investors to come to Taiwan, due to various regulations of the 
Taiwanese government. The Taiwanese government also acknow-
ledges the challenging environment for opening up the Taiwanese IT 
industry to Chinese investment: it is necessary but not desirable. In 
December 2015 John Deng (Deng Zhenzhong), at that time econom-
ics minister, said that the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) 
would consider allowing Chinese investors to buy minority stakes in 
local integrated-circuit-design companies under certain conditions 
(Hung and Huang 2015). Though the announcement aims to show 
more governmental willingness, it also demonstrates reservations on 
the part of the Taiwanese government in setting the conditions for 
Chinese investment. The government’s attitude is understandable 
since, as discussed in the second section, chip design is at the core of 
Taiwanese IT vitality and relates to national security as well. The Tai-
wanese government therefore has to be very careful of opening up a 
space for Chinese investment in this sensitive area. However, the 
speed of capital investment does not wait for the government’s even-
tual decision. 
  Chinese Investment in Taiwan 53 

In 2011 Lenovo started to plan a joint venture with Compal in 
Kunshan: LianBo was formally established at the end of 2012. Com-
pal, a Taiwanese company based in Kunshan since 2003, is the sec-
ond-biggest notebook computer manufacturer in the world. The 
reason that Compal wanted to establish the joint venture with 
Lenovo was the domestic market that Lenovo provided: 
We wanted to increase our sales quantity, Lenovo wanted our 
know-how, that’s why we think this joint venture suited our needs. 
We are not afraid that Lenovo will “steal” our know-how because 
we always remind ourselves to keep improving our know-how, to 
maintain a certain technology know-how gap between us and 
Lenovo. (Anonymous 10 2015)  
At the end of 2014, Tsinghua Tongfang bought the computer-manu-
facturing company Zi-he, establishing a factory in Suzhou Industrial 
Park in 2001. The company is an ODM computer manufacturer. 
After more than a decade in China, the heads of Zi-he realised that it 
would be much easier to let domestic enterprise take care of explor-
ing the market and competing with other domestic enterprises for 
market channels, while Zi-he could focus on production (Anonym-
ous 11 2016).  
These two cases evince that cooperation in fact does exist be-
tween Chinese capital and Taiwanese technology. In order to main-
tain the position of Taiwan’s IT manufacturing, and in order to be 
better than the Chinese enterprises, especially those enterprises with 
governmental capital support, Taiwanese companies should indeed 
invest in deepening advanced technology. The only solution for Tai-
wanese companies is to improve their R&D, to specialise in manufac-
turing certain parts, to keep the know-how gap between Taiwan’s and 
China’s IT manufacturing. As a result, the combination of Chinese 
capital and Taiwanese know-how can in fact give a harsh but positive 
push to Taiwan’s IT industry. Taiwanese IT manufacturers have to 
keep pursuing better skills and technology; the cross-Strait technology 
competition will likely never end. 
Conclusion 
To answer the questions posed at the beginning of this paper: 
Has Chinese investment in Taiwan threatened the development 
of Taiwan’s high-technology industry? Yes and no. First, Chinese 
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investment has not threatened the development of Taiwan’s high-
technology industry because the cases of investment are few, due to 
the unwillingness of most Chinese private entrepreneurs to invest in 
Taiwan and the Taiwanese government’s strict regulation of Chinese 
investment in Taiwan. Taiwan’s market holds little attraction for Chi-
nese investors, and Taiwan’s capacity for R&D and innovation is also 
insufficiently convincing for many Chinese high-technology investors 
to cross the Strait. Headhunting those Taiwanese engineers or R&D 
designers might be an easier way for the Chinese high-technology 
companies to acquire core Taiwanese know-how. Second, although 
Chinese investment in Taiwan did not threaten the development of 
Taiwan’s high-technology industries, their prospects for future devel-
opment are rather bleak. Taiwan’s technology capacity has been 
chased by rapidly learned or copied Chinese counterparts. China has 
become a global market attracting not only foreign investors but also 
high-skilled workers. Along with its plan for industrial upgrading, the 
Chinese government supports the domestic industrial supply chain 
almost unconditionally. Taiwanese factories that in the past have 
always been a reliable partner of the supply chain are now facing the 
emergence of a Chinese domestic supply chain, or the so-called “red 
supply chain” (China Post 2015), while many Taiwanese electronics or 
IT factories have to prepare either to integrate better into the “red 
supply chain” or to move out of China. The difficulty for Taiwanese 
electronics or IT factories wishing to move out of China is, ironically, 
that they are already deeply embedded in the long-existing industrial 
clusters in China. It probably will be more practical and more realistic 
for Taiwanese IT/electronics factories to consider how to merge 
better with the Chinese supply chain, either as parts providers or as 
technology consultants. 
The other half-answer is “yes” because, as reflected in the field-
work so far, there are indeed cases of joint ventures or acquisitions 
between Chinese and Taiwanese IT companies. There are two rea-
sons that such joint ventures and acquisitions did not take place in 
Taiwan. First, from the market perspective, those Taiwanese com-
panies had all relocated to China since the early 2000s, so it is easier 
for them to collaborate with Chinese companies. The second, per-
haps more salient, reason is that the Taiwanese government’s regula-
tions discouraged many Chinese investors. Nevertheless, although 
Taiwanese government regulations are lengthy and difficult to meet, 
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and Taiwanese society generally holds a sceptical attitude towards 
Chinese investment, Tsinghua Unigroup expressed their willingness 
to buy 25 per cent of the shares of certain Taiwanese companies. The 
reason, according to this analysis, is not because of Taiwan’s market, 
but because of human capital: a group of talented Taiwanese workers 
that are not so easily headhunted. 
Finally, the emphasis of this article is that the core issue affecting 
Taiwan’s high-technology development is not Chinese investment in 
Taiwan and the possible threats coming along with this investment. 
Rather, the tangible challenge for Taiwan’s high-technology industries 
is finding a suitable niche in the rising Chinese high-technology mar-
ket, no matter whether that niche would rest on the Chinese main-
land or in Taiwan. A further challenge is how Taiwanese manufactur-
ers, whether based in Taiwan or China, can keep improving the core 
technology – not by rejecting collaborative opportunities with Chi-
nese companies, but by strategically opening up. 
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